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Introduction
In China, public policy has stressed equality between ethnic groups. China's 55 officially recognised national minorities (Minzu) are unequally distributed over the country. An important part of the policy is the system of regional autonomy which consists of intersecting territories. The largest autonomous areas are the five autonomous regions (zizhi qu): Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia and Inner Mongolia. Ethnic regional autonomy has several dimensions: cultural, allowing official use of the minority language, for example, as well as social, by promoting minority persons to become cadre and take part in policymaking and policy implementation. Ethnic regional autonomy also has an economic dimension by the provision of special funding to the autonomous areas.
In each of the autonomous regions there are minority persons as well as members of the Han majority, although the proportions vary across regions. In Tibet and Xinjiang, minority persons are in the majority while they are in the minority in the other three regions. Clearly it should be of great interest to know if and to what extent there are ethnic income and poverty disparities within the autonomous regions. Are the minorities masters in their home regions, or are they at a disadvantage compared to the Han majority also living there? The existence of an income gap can foster social tensions. However, there seems to be no study investigating the question, which provides one motivation for this paper.
Here we focus on the rural part of Ningxia Hui autonomous region and compare the Hui minority to the Han majority with an emphasis on household income and poverty. Ningxia
Hui autonomous region, located in northwest China has a population of slightly more than six million persons of whom approximately one-third are Hui and two-thirds belong to the Han 5 majority. The Hui and the Han have language and physical appearance in common and yet they differ, as the Hui are Muslims and historically have their own identity. Differences between the Hui and Han are visible in religious practice, diet, dress and often name. As we will show using a unique sample survey for circumstances in 2006, the two populations are rather separated from each other when it comes to marriage and to a somewhat lesser extent to friendship.
Muslim minorities of considerable size are found in other countries, as well. For example, rich countries in northern Europe are now home to a large number of Muslim persons due to recent immigration. A particularly worrisome situation is illustrated in results from the latest research which indicates that such Muslim minorities are economically disadvantaged compared to the majority population of the country where they live. This has been shown to be the case in Britain (Georgladis and Manning, 2011) as well as in Germany (Buechel and Frick, 2004) . In India, too, the Muslim minority is in an economically disfavoured situation in many aspects compared to the Hindu majority (Basant and Shafiff, 2010) . Therefore results from this study comparing the Hui and Han in rural Ningxia should not only be of importance for those interested in Chinese circumstances. We are actually addressing the following question: To what extent are there gaps in income and poverty in a location where Muslims have lived for many generations? This is the second motivation for our study.
This study shows that the Hui are disadvantaged both in terms of length of education and possession of household wealth within the region in which they are supposed to have a special position. However, a central result is that there is no divide between Hui and Han in rural Ningxia regarding average household income and poverty when the latter is estimated using poverty lines applied by the National Bureau of Statistics for the same year. This paradox can 6 be explained by the Hui earning more income outside the farm. In particular, young male Hui living in poor villages have a remarkably high likelihood of migrating, thereby bringing home income to their households. We are not aware of any previous study on an ethnic minority in China in which such a mechanism has been shown.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: In Section 2 we survey the literature on ethnic disparities in household income and poverty in China. Section 3 presents some facts on the Ningxia autonomous region and the Hui ethnic group. The survey we work with is introduced in Section 4. Some key facts on the two ethnic groups including length of education and household wealth are presented in Section 5. Section 6 compares household income and poverty for the two ethnic groups. The same section also investigates factors that determine household income and rural migration in order to better understand the lack of difference in mean household income and the extent of poverty across the two ethic groups. Finally we sum up the findings in the concluding section.
Ethnic income disparities in rural China according to previous research
As the result of a historical process, the People's Republic of China now officially defines ethnic minority people as those persons belonging to one of 55 recognised ethnic minorities and not the Han majority. Ethnic status is registered on the identification card possessed by citizens of China. In PRC policy, minorities are given certain advantages. For example, minorities have preferred treatment regarding entry to higher studies, and many minority groups are exempted from the one-child policy. 1 7 A fact of relevance for understanding ethnic differences in income and poverty in China is that its minority population is spatially unevenly distributed. More ethnic minority groups live in rural areas than the majority population, and most are concentrated to the less-developed western part of the country. Even within province level units, ethnic minorities can be concentrated to regions that are less developed. One example of a study of ethnic minority migration in China is Iredale et al (2001) . Here (Chapter 4), migration rates between minorities and the majority are compared using the 1990
census. The study reports that rates of movement within provinces are relatively similar but lower rates of minority movements across province boundaries are found. areas of China and kept their rural hukou, reported that in the new location the migrants earned considerably more than at their rural origins.
Context
According to for some decades carried out resettlement projects (Merkle, 2003) . The area used for agricultural production has decreased due to the implementation of national policies aimed at reducing soil erosion by converting farm land on steep slopes into forest and compensating farmers thereafter (see for example Zhang et al, 2008 and Demurger and Wan, 2012) .
Furthermore, Ningxia is one of China's less-industrialised province level units.
Many rural households in China have sought to improve their economic situation by sending family members as migrants or commuters to places with better employment conditions.
Results from our survey show that temporary migration in Ningxia is typically short, as only a minority of migrants have moved out of Ningxia. Migration often takes the form of chain migration. As opposed to many other parts of China, local government officials in rural Ningxia have taken an active role in promoting out-migration of its inhabitants, as the officials' performance can be evaluated based on the number of out-migrants in their jurisdiction.
Data
We use data from a socioeconomic survey 10 See McKinley (1996) , Brenner (2001) , Gustafsson et al (2006) , Zhao and Ding (2008) and Li and Zhao (2008 Hui households on average own less valued net wealth than Han households and the gap is estimated to be 29 percent. The gap is somewhat larger when it comes to user's right to land and possession of productive assets. In contrast, the ethnic gap in the value of consumer durables is not more than 15 percent and there is actually no statistically significant difference when it comes to financial wealth. The Gini coefficients are similar for the two ethnicities, with a value of 0.44 for Han and 0.45 for Hui.
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We have thus found that on average the Hui are not as advantaged as the Han in Ningxia in terms of length of education as well as household wealth. If these were the only circumstances affecting how much income a household earns we would expect to find the Hui to be disadvantaged compared to the Han. And yet, this is not what we report in the next section.
Income and poverty in rural Ningxia
12 The Gini coefficient is an inequality index that takes values from 0 (no inequality) up to 1.0.
13 These numbers are higher than reported for rural China as a whole in studies referring to earlier years. Based on CHIP data, Zhao and Ding (2008) It is a widely held view in Chinese society that the Hui show great skill in taking advantage of income earning opportunities (see Yang and Ding, 2003, Yang, 2012) . This can be due to necessity as reported in the previous section, as they own fewer user rights to land and productive assets and they have shorter educations than the Han. One can claim that over the One way to investigate whether the Hui have a better ability to take advantage of income generating opportunities is to estimate income functions that include a number of variables which are likely to affect household income. In the specification, a dummy for Hui ethnicity is also included and we expect that the coefficient will be positive. The outcome of this exercise is shown in Table 3 . Explanatory variables include average number of years of education of household members in work active ages measured in years, and average age of adult household members and household size measured as number of persons. We also include the square of each of the three variables in order to allow for possible non-linear effects. Further we include as explanatory variables the percentage of household members that are of work active ages and the percentage of the working members that are members of China's Communist Party. We also include the percentage of family members that are in poor health and the contracted farm land measured in mu. Estimates are shown in Table 3 .
/ Table 3 about here/
The parameter of main interest in Table 3 , the coefficient for Hui ethnicity in the equation for household income, is positive and estimated with high t-statistics. Thus given a number of income generating variables, Hui are earning more than Han. From the estimates in Table 3 we also learn that household per capita income is positively affected by years of education among adult members but at a decreasing rate, and negatively affected by household size at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, per capita household income is positively affected by the percentage of household members of working age and negatively affected by the percentage of household members in poor health. The amount of contracted farm land has a positive effect on household income.
/ Table 4 about here/ One possible reason for the positive coefficient for the Hui dummy in Table 3 is that the Hui are more involved in migration. This can be seen in Table 4 which also shows that in rural Ningxia migration is typically a male activity. As many as 46 percent of Hui males were involved in migration in 2006, while the corresponding proportion among Han males was 35 percent. Hui migrants earn on average less than Han migrants. On average, migration lasted for about half a year. Data from our survey and from Ningxia Statistical Bureau indicate that many migrants work in construction. Often people migrate over a short distance. Out of province migration is typically to neighbouring provinces. Note that the information in Table   4 indicates that most migrant income is sent home.
We are interested in better understanding to what extent migration in Ningxia is influenced by low village income and by ethnicity. We have therefore specified and estimated probit models for the subsample of adult household members who are in work active ages. As can be seen in The pattern we find is a very clear negative relation between mean income of the village and the probability of migrating. In other words, people migrate because they live in a poor village. 15 However, as migrants bring home income, it follows that migration has an income redistributing function across villages. Turning to individual characteristics used in the specifications, we find that age negatively affects the probability of migrating as does being female. Two household variables are found to affect the probability of migrating. Per capita land has a negative effect as does the number of children in the household. Having access to a significant amount of land as well as having children makes people less likely to migrate. In Figure 1 we use Specification 3 reported in Table 5 to predict the probability of migrating for persons with different characteristics. For a base person (A), a man aged 23 and living in a village belonging to the lowest decile according to per capita income, the probability of migrating is predicted to be 52 percent. The corresponding probability is 36 percent if the village has a mean income placing it in the top decile (the second panel), that is to say 16 percent lower. The large importance of age is evident, as changing the age of the base person to 40 (case E) makes the probability for migration to go down from 52 percent to 24 percent, a reduction of 28 percent. This change is almost identical to the probability obtained for being aged 23 and female (B). Changing the amount of land the household has access to (F and G) for the base individual leads to a variation in migration probability of ten percentage units.
From Figure 1 we can also learn that compared to the variations in the variables village income, age and gender, the importance of number of children in the household (Cases H, I, J and K) is of lesser importance.
/ Table 6 about here/ Have the higher migration activities among the Hui partly triggered by low village income in combination with a higher frequency of out of farm work fully compensated the disadvantage of being less educated and owning less valuable land when it comes to earning an income? In Table 6 we compare income components per capita, average household income per capita and income inequality among Hui and Han in rural Ningxia. Interestingly enough, we find that average total income per capita is estimated to be identical among Hui and Han. True, Hui have agriculture income amounting to only 65 percent of the agricultural income for Han.
However, this is fully compensated for by higher income from wages and business as well as non-agriculture income. Much of this is due to higher migration activities and other non-farm activities.
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/ Table 7 about here/ Table 6 also shows that income inequality among Hui measured by the Gini coefficient is larger than among Han (0.45 to be compared with 0.36). 17 As we will see in Table 7 this is consistent with non-agricultural income constituting a larger fraction of total income among Hui than among Han, and non-agriculture income being more concentrated to high total income. Furthermore, the concentration of non-agriculture income to those with a high income is particularly high among Hui. Table 7 shows results from decomposing the Gini coefficient by income sources for each of the two ethnicities. The Gini for total net income is a weighted sum of the concentration coefficients for each income component. The relative shares of each income component are the weights. The Concentration coefficient indicates the association between the income component and total net income and can take values from -1 to + 1. The higher the value of the concentration coefficient, the stronger the particular income component concentrated to high income units. Table 7 shows that 22 percent of total income among Hui came from non-agricultural income, having a concentration coefficient as high as 0.70. The last column shows that as much as 35 percent of the Gini value for Hui can be attributed to non-agricultural income. The corresponding number for the Han majority is not more than 14 percent (of a lower Gini).
16 Our data does not allow us to isolate the importance of remittances from migrants as a separate income component. for Hui and 4.5 percent for Han. The proportion of Hui falling under the low income line is estimated to 12.1 percent and 10.3 percent among Han. However, note that at higher income levels, the graph for Hui is higher than the graph for Han. This means that for higher poverty lines, Hui would be deemed to be more poverty prone than Han. 
Conclusions
In this study we have investigated income and poverty of Hui and Han persons living in rural The explanation for this paradox is that the rural Hui to a larger extent than the rural Han are involved in non-farm work that includes migration. According to our data, as many as almost one in two male Hui in Ningxia migrated in 2006 and they brought home substantial amounts of income. Results from estimated models indicate that a low village income is one but not the only factor behind the higher probability of Hui to migrate. This analysis has also illustrated that the probability of migrating is particularly high for young Hui males living in a lowincome village in households with little land and no dependent children. We have shown that
Hui households earn more in non-agricultural income than Han and such incomes are disproportionately concentrated to those better off. The latter is an important reason why the 22 distribution of income among Hui is found to be rather unequal, more unequal than among
Han.
To round off, the main result of this paper has been to find a non-existent ethnic income gap and poverty gap in rural areas of Ningxia. It will be an important task for future research to investigate whether different or similar results can be found for urban Ningxia as well as for 
